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Since its arrival in Solomon Islands in July 2003, the Australian
Government-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
(RAMSI) has made a number of significant achievements, including
restoring peace in the nation and discipline to the budgetary process.
Budget deficits have been contained, foreign reserves have recovered to
healthy levels, inflation is down to single digits, and interest rates on
domestic credit are trending down. These are no mean achievements, but
the economy is as yet to show significant signs of a rebound. Even with
the large fiscal stimulus provided by donor funds, per capita income over
the past two years has only grown at an annual rate of 1.7 per cent. At
this rate, it will take some 19 years to recover the ground lost during the
crisis. It is indeed time for the Solomon Islands government to face up to
the challenge of raising the rate of growth of output if the current
generation is to see discernable improvements in their wellbeing.
July 2005 marks the second anniversary of
the commencement of the Regional Assistance
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). This
anniversary brings with it the opportunity
to reflect on the achievements to date and the
challenges that lie ahead. This paper provides
an objective account of the road travelled
since the first peacekeepers landed on Red
Beach; particularly with respect to progress
in creating sustainable income-earning
opportunities for the half-million Solomon
Islanders who welcomed the mission when
it reached the shores of this country once
labelled ‘the friendly isles’.1 Peace has
returned to Honiara, normalcy is returning
slowly to the countryside. The runaway
public debt—due to persistent government
deficits that reached 11 per cent of GDP and
pushed debt to 113 per cent of GDP in 2002—
has been reined in, credit extended by local
businesses to government is being cleared
for the first time since 1996, foreign exchange
restrictions imposed in June 2000 have been
relaxed, foreign reserves that had fallen to
less than one month of import cover in late
2002 had bounced back by May 2005 to 8
months of import cover, and basic services
are slowly recovering the ground lost during
the four-year conflict. These achievements
were made with the help of some 2,000
military and police personnel, another 20
technical assistance personnel placed within
the Ministry of Finance, and an injection of
significant sums of donor funds.
2PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Economic survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 20 Number 2 August 2005  © Asia Pacific Press
Donors have been extremely generous to
Solomon Islands, but such generosity in the
absence of good economic management can
impede growth. Aid provided for 2003
amounted to US$60 million, equivalent to 24
per cent of national income.2 More recent data
is not available, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that aid inflows have increased
rapidly since then. The 2005 Budget shows
that donors funded approximately 55 per
cent of the recurrent budget and nearly the
entire development budget. Australian
support in the first year of RAMSI amounted
to some A$200 million; this is to continue
with a four-year total commitment given in
the 2005–06 Australian Commonwealth
budget of A$841 million.3 The European
Union has committed development grants
totalling US$100 million and the Asian
Development Bank has lifted its suspension
on a US$10 million lending program
approved in 2002 (International Monetary
Fund 2004). Such large injections of donor
funds will (and should) taper off over the
coming decade when Solomon Islands will
be expected to generate its own funds for
sustaining the machinery of the state. Large
injections of aid can create significant
problems for economic management; namely,
the loss of competitiveness of the domestic
tradable sector, that is, the ‘Dutch disease’
phenomenon, and lead to inflationary
pressures given the fixed exchange rate
regime. The improvement in the budgetary
position of the state has already created wage
pressures, with public servants and members
of parliament given a one-off pay rise late in
2004. These wage pressures are likely to
ripple throughout the economy, given that
the public sector is the largest employer and
sets the employment conditions for the rest
of the economy.
While local capacity to generate
revenues from internal sources to fund the
current level of commitments is clearly
lacking, rapid and sustained economic
growth has to take place over the forthcoming
decade if Solomon Islands is to be in a
position to fund its recurrent budget from
internal sources. The conditions for such
growth have to be put in place now; thus
Solomon Islanders, and their leaders in
particular, must face up to the challenges of
putting the economy on a higher growth
trajectory. In short, Solomon Islands has to
face up to the challenges of development now.
A slow economic recovery
The Solomon Islands’ economy is on a slow
road to recovery. Aggregate GDP fell by 25
per cent in the three years of conflict, but the
return of peace has brought a growth
dividend of 3.8 per cent in 2003, 5.8 per cent
in 2004, and the expectation of another 5 per
cent in 2005. This rebound is welcome, but
there is still a long way to go to recover lost
ground during the four-year crisis. Aggregate
GDP to the end of 2004 had bounced back to
86 per cent of the level in 1998 while per
capita GDP had edged back to 73 per cent of
the level then; the large discrepancy between
the two is explained by population growth
of approximately 2.8 per cent per annum.4 It
will take another decade to reach the level of
per capita income in 1998 if aggregate GDP
continues to grow at around 6 per cent
annually. Aggregate GDP would need to
grow in excess of 10 per cent per annum if
Solomon Islanders are to see noticeable
increases in their income over the coming
decade. This in itself is daunting, but other
challenges include the political hurdles in
the approach to the upcoming elections in
2006, the court challenge to the legality of
RAMSI, and the risk of an HIV/AIDS
epidemic.
Solomon Islands is not a resource-poor
country (Table 1). The data on Solomon
Islands is of poor quality, thus the figures
reported must be interpreted with caution.
Population density is low compared to both
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Fiji and Indonesia, per capita GDP is 65 per
cent that of Papua New Guinea, while aid
receipts on a per capita basis as of 2001 were
3.5 times that of Papua New Guinea and
considerably higher than Fiji and Indonesia.
Solomon Islands has a total land area that is
one and a half times that of Fiji, and thus has
a population density that is much lower than
Fiji and marginally greater than Papua New
Guinea but significantly less than that of
Indonesia. There is considerable potential for
expansion of primary production given the
large subsistence sector, the mostly under-
utilised coastal and marine resources, and the
yet to be explored mineral deposits. The
nation is known to have rich gold deposits on
Guadalcanal and Western Province, and
nickel deposits on Isabel Island, with ongoing
prospecting for copper, oil, and diamonds
(International Monetary Fund 2004).
Social indicators of development
The social indicators of development for
Solomon Islands compare unfavourably to
those for Fiji and Vanuatu and are only
marginally better than those for Papua New
Guinea. The rapid population growth,
measured at the last census in 1999 at 2.8
per cent per annum, is forecast to slow down
over the next decade to approximately 2.3
per cent. Some 42 per cent of the population
are less than 15 years of age, thus the growth
momentum is likely to continue for a
generation at least. The rate of spread of HIV/
AIDS could adversely affect the rate of growth
of the population, however. Gender
disparities in Solomon Islands are the highest
in the region, with only 30 girls for every 100
boys enrolled in tertiary education; the
corresponding figures for Fiji, Papua New
Guinea, and Vanuatu are 100, 55, and 50,
respectively (Secretariat of the Pacific
Community 2004). These figures suggest that
eliminating gender disparities will take
considerable concerted and sustained effort.
Solomon Islands ranks poorly relative to two
of its three Melanesian neighbours on all the
social indicators of development and has a
rate of incidence of malaria that is the worst
in the Pacific (Table 2). Solomon Islands,
moreover, has all of the risk factors associated
with the spread of HIV/AIDS. The incidence
of HIV/AIDS, therefore, could be much
Table 1 Some basic indicators of development, 2001
Solomon Papua
Islandsa New Guinea Fiji Indonesia
Population (‘000) 431 5,253 817 208,980
Per capita GDP (PPP, US$) 1,910 2,570 4,850 2,940
Per capita GDP (1995 US$) 587 897 2763 1,034
Population density (per square kilometre) 15 12 45 115
Investment rate (per cent of GDP) .. 19 13 17
Liquid liabilities (M3/GDP, per cent) 30 32 38 57
Aid (per cent of GNI) 22.2 7.2 1.5 1.1
Aid per capita (US$) 136.60 38.67 31.78 7.18
Source: Data for Solomon Islands is from Central Bank of Solomon Islands 2005. Monthly Economic Bulletin,
Volume 2, Number 6, Central Bank of Solomon Islands, Honiara. Data for other countries is for 2001 and
sourced from World Bank, 2003. World Economic Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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higher, given the high rates in neighbouring
Papua New Guinea that has a very similar
risk profile.
Demand for public goods such as primary
education, basic healthcare, and access to
transport infrastructure is likely to grow in
the short to medium term. Solomon Islands
historically has had high rates of population
growth; the fertility rate at 5.3 is one of the
highest in the world.5 The demand for primary
education and basic healthcare will grow as
more people access these services with the
improving law and order situation. The
relatively low primary school enrolment rates
and the high incidence of malaria suggest that
the demands on budgetary resources for basic
health services will grow. The poor state of
transport infrastructure and internationally
uncompetitive utilities will also demand
significant public investment. The resources
for such investment are lacking, however.
Macroeconomic conditions
The level and the rate of growth of per capita
GDP over the period from independence is
shown in Figure 1. The level of income is
expressed in constant US dollars at 1995
prices. Per capita income peaked in 1996 at
US$850, and was on the way down when
the crisis began in mid 1999. By the end of
1998, per capita income had fallen by 6 per
Table 2 Social indicators of development
Solomon Papua New
Islands Guinea Fiji Vanuatu
Life expectancy 61a 57 69 68
Illiteracy rate (adult) .. 35 7 ..
Primary school enrolment rate (data for 2000) 56 77.4 94.7 78.2
Under 5 mortality rate (per ‘000 live births)b 73 88 22 33
Under-weight children
  (per cent of <5yr olds, data for 2000)b 21.0 24.9 15.0c 12.1
Fertility rate 5.3 4.4 2.7 4.4
Forecast population growth rate (2004–15)b 2.3 2.2 0.7 2.7
Incidence of malaria
  (per 100,000 population, data for 2002)b 16,170 1,430 - 6,930
Death rate from TB
  (per 100,000 population, data for 2002)b 14.8 56.0 0.4 16.3
Number of known HIV/AIDS cases 2 7,320 142 2
  (date) (2/2004) (8/2002) (12/ 2003) (12/2003)
a Data from the Solomon Islands National Statistics Office, 2005. Social Statistics, Government of Solomon
Islands, Honiara.
b Data from Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2004. Pacific Islands Regional Millennium Development Goals
Report 2004, November, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea.
c Data for 1990.
Source: Data for life expectancy and fertility rate (that is, the number of live births per ‘000 women) are for
2001 and extracted from World Bank 2003. World Economic Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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cent from the peak with the remainder of the
fall taking place during the period of the crisis;
that is from 1999 to 2002. At the end of 2002,
per capita income had fallen by one third
from its peak in 1996. The collapse in
production during the crisis is not peculiar
to Solomon Islands; experiences from
neighbouring Fiji and several African nations
show similar and possibly larger collapses
during periods of conflict. The data do not
show the levels of income to the end of June
2003; and even more importantly the trauma
and pains of those directly affected by the
violence. The eviction of many from their
homes and places of employment, the
retraction of formal activity into subsistence
production, the loss of freedom of movement
by the innocent majority trapped in their
homes during the fighting, and the loss of
access to basic services such as primary
education and basic healthcare by many
Solomon Islanders are not captured by the
data, but the effects of these may very well
have overwhelmed the loss of GDP (Figure
1). While the fighting was mostly confined
to Guadalcanal, the whole nation suffered
from loss of public services as the apparatus
of the central government based in Honiara
was paralysed by the crisis.
Since its arrival in July 2003, RAMSI has
been successful in restoring and then
maintaining peace and stability. GDP in this
period has grown at approximately 4.5 per
cent annually; with a population growth rate
of approximately 2.8 per cent, per capita GDP
has risen at an average of 1.7 per cent per
year. At this rate, it will take some 19 years to
reach the level of per capita income at the
end of 1998; and by then Solomon Islands
would have only recovered the ground lost
Figure 1 Solomon Islands: per capita GDP, levels and growth rates since independence,
1978–2004
Source: Data to 2001 is from World Bank 2003. Data from 2001 onwards is based on growth rates reported
by International Monetary Fund, 2004. Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV Consultation, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; and Asian Development Bank, 2005. Country programming mission to
the Solomon Islands 2005, Mission Report, Asian Development Bank, Manila (unpublished).
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during the four-year crisis. The one clear
lesson from the crisis in Solomon Islands is
that conflicts play havoc with an economy,
and have long-lasting and adverse
consequences for the welfare of the resident
population. The other, and possibly less clear,
lesson from this experience is that a stagnant
economy, particularly in a climate of rapid
population growth, is a recipe for conflicts
(see Chand 2002). Both of these observations
underscore the importance of maintaining
peace, possibly with an efficient law and
order machinery and from growth of the
domestic economy that provides jobs to those
seeking employment. Per capita income
would need to grow by an average of 7 per
cent over the next decade if Solomon Islands
is to double its current (that is, 2005) level of
per capita income and even then it would
have just surpassed the current level of per
capita income in Papua New Guinea. Given
the projected annual population growth rate
of 2.3 per cent, aggregate GDP would need to
grow by 9.3 per cent. These achievements,
modest as they may appear, will not come
about without decisive action on the part of
Solomon Islanders.
Fiscal position—budget deficit and debt
levels of the state
Expenditure growth has been contained
through improved governance. The civil
service payroll has been cleansed of ‘ghost’
workers; and, some 800 ex-militants hired
as police officers during the crisis have been
demobilised. The Office of the Auditor
General has been tasked to carry out audits
of government departments with an
additional SBD$2.3 million in the 2005
Budget. The audits, to have the desired effect
of improving governance, would have to be
released to the public in a timely fashion. The
ministries of Education and Human
Resource Development and Health received
the largest share, 28 and 13 per cent,
respectively, of the total outlay of SBD$655
million in the 2005 recurrent budget. Primary
education, basic health, and law and order
ranked high in terms of the allocation of
public resources. The government has
allocated SBD$9.4 million in the 2005 Budget
to fund an 8 per cent one-off payment to
public servants. Another SBD$2.4 million
has been allocated to fund terminal grants of
SBD$40,000 each for the 50 members of
parliament when the current parliament is
dissolved on 5 December 2005, with the
balance of the SBD$400,000 being used to
fund increases in salaries and allowances
for members of parliament.
Revenues have increased since the
return of peace as compliance with the
existing laws has improved. Further growth
in tax collections would have to be sourced
from increased GDP since tax effort at 26 per
cent of GDP may already have peaked.
Donors continue to provide budgetary
support, but this is due to be phased out in
the near term. Support to the recurrent budget
from Australia lapsed at the end of 2004 while
that from New Zealand to the education
budget could lapse at the end of 2005. Foreign
aid, however, continues to provide
substantial support to recurrent activities.
The 2005 recurrent budget, for example, had
donor support of SBD$40 million to
education, SBD$50 million to health, SBD $90
million to administration of justice, and some
SBD$550 million to police. The Australian
Government paid the arrears and serviced
commitments to the Asian Development
Bank and the World Bank to mid 2004,
assistance valued at SBD$11.4 million; in
addition, Australia provided recurrent-
budget support of some SBD$60 million in
2004 (Zama 2004). The pressure to raise funds
domestically to fund the recurrent budget will
increase considerably as the recurrent budget
is weaned off donor support.
A medium-term fiscal financing
framework is being developed to factor in the
anticipated declines in donor funding and
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ongoing commitments to new development
projects, with a view to keeping debt levels
in check. The prevailing debt situation, and
a moratorium on further public-sector
borrowing, will put additional pressure on
domestic revenues, particularly if budget
balance is to be maintained. Domestically
sourced revenues accounted for only 45 per
cent of the SBD$1.4 billion recurrent
expenditure in the 2005 Budget. Some of the
SBD$770 million provided by donors to the
recurrent budget is spent outside Solomon
Islands, including on overseas training,
equipment and supplies. While the donors
continue to fund nearly the entire
development budget, there is a risk that donor
support will be withdrawn from the recurrent
budget exactly when the absorptive capacity
for greater assistance is established.6 The
improving law and order situation, for
example, allows expansion of basic services
to rural communities but this can only be
done with donor support given the
prevailing fiscal position. The medium-term
framework covers the recurrent budget
only—the failure to account for the
implications of the development budget on
the future recurrent budget could be
problematic. A clear set of development
priorities together with a corresponding set
of monitoring and evaluations framework
could see better use of the available resources
to the public sector.
The government of Solomon Islands has
made good progress in managing its debt
obligations, but much remains to be done
before a sustainable position is reached.
Public debt as of May 2005, inclusive of
arrears to trade creditors and contingent
liabilities, amounted to SBD$2.2 billion,
equivalent to nearly 100 per cent of GDP. 7
Some 54 per cent of this debt is external with
most of it being held by international
financial institutions and mostly on
concessional terms. The 2005 Budget
allocation for debt servicing of SBD$112
million represents some 20 per cent of
domestic revenue while the cost of servicing
all of the debt at SBD$130 million would
amount to approximately a quarter of
domestic revenues. The International
Monetary Fund (2004:7) estimates that by
2009 debt levels will have fallen to 65 per
cent of GDP while the share of external debt
will decline to a sustainable level of 42 per
cent.
Local financial institutions, namely the
National Provident Fund and the three
commercial banks, as well as trade creditors,
hold the domestic debt. These financial
institutions have agreed to a restructuring
in the form of a heavily discounted
amortising bond that gives them the certainty
of repayments over the long term. The
restructured bond has a lower interest rate
(from as much as 9 per cent to an average of
2.25 per cent), a longer term of up to 14 years
with a grace period of 7 years applying to
half of the principal, and some 60 per cent of
the interest arrears, valued at approximately
SBD$11.9 million, being written off (Zama
2004). The government, on its part, has
agreed to meet monthly repayments on the
restructured amortising bond: an
arrangement that will ease cash-flow
management whilst maintaining fiscal
credibility. Domestic creditors have taken a
large hit in this restructuring, but the
arrangement is better than having the
government continue to default on its
obligations (the government first defaulted
on its domestic debt in 1996). The National
Provident Fund, the largest creditor to the
state, made provisions for bad debts of
SBD$52.9 million in 2004.8 This leaves the
balance sheet of the fund in a precarious
position with assets totalling some SBD$13.9
million; a sum considered to be well short of
the future obligations in terms of member
entitlements.9
While considerable progress has been
made in clearing arrears, the government is
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still in default on some of its debts with the
prevailing debt position remaining
unsustainable.10 A debt management strategy
was put in place in 2004 and is being used to
progressively pay down and restructure debt.
Trade creditors, for example, after having
their claims verified have been paid in full or
up to a minimum of SBD$6,000 per claim.
Up to December 2004, the government had
paid half of the balance owing to public sector
employees. These debt payments have
provided a stimulus to domestic economic
activity, particularly in Honiara.
Monetary conditions
The recovery of exports in 2004 and a steady
increase in imports has led to an
improvement in the balance of trade. The
balance of trade for the first eight months of
2004, the most recent period for which data
is available, had a surplus of SBD$124
million. The trade surplus, together with
large injections of foreign aid, has led to a
rapid build up of foreign reserves. As of May
2005, foreign reserves with the Central Bank
of Solomon Islands were at a record high of
SBD$646.8 million, sufficient for eight
months of import cover (Central Bank of
Solomon Islands 2005). The Central Bank
was nearly out of reserves in 2002, but now
faces the opposite challenge of managing this
build up so as to prevent a real exchange
rate appreciation. The Central Bank of
Solomon Islands may have to mop up any
excess liquidity and sterilise the large aid
flows over the short to medium term; such
action will adversely affect its balance sheet.
Annual inflation (measured by changes
in the three-month average Honiara retail
price index) peaked at 15 per cent in early
2003 but has since fallen and as of May 2005
was at 5.3 per cent; inflation is expected to be
around 6 per cent for 2005. The return to law
and order has improved food supplies into
the Honiara market, thus driving down food
prices. The higher oil prices and costs of
housing have offset some of the impact of
lower food prices, however. The interest rate,
as measured by the Central Bank’s
‘indicative weighted average interest rate’,
as of May 2005 was 14.5 per cent, while the
corresponding rate on deposits was 0.98 per
cent. The high interest rates on borrowings,
the negative real (that is, inflation adjusted)
interest rates on deposits, and a significant
build up of liquidity within the banking
system indicate serious problems with
financial intermediation. The high interest
rate margins, in particular, indicate that
lending-risk remains high and potentially a
short supply of ‘bankable’ projects. This is
evidenced by the fact that banks have held
short-term (that is 28-day) Treasury Bills with
yields of around 2.7 per cent rather than
reduce the lending rate to private enterprise.
Two of the three major domestic financial
institutions are in serious strife. The Develop-
ment Bank of Solomon Islands is reported to
be insolvent and the Central Bank of Solomon
Islands is in the process of managing its
closure (International Monetary Fund 2004).
The National Provident Fund is also in
financial difficulty, with members threatening
industrial action on account of the poor
management of their funds. National
Provident Fund management have an
obligation to the contributors in maximising
the return on their equity but to date the fund
has been a source of cheap credit to the
government and for high-risk, politically
motivated projects. Policymakers, and
Central Bank of Solomon Islands (given its
responsibility for prudential supervision),
could draw on the experiences of Vanuatu,
which managed its way out of a very similar
predicament in 1997 (see Asian Development
Bank 2002).
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Sectoral prospects
Agriculture accounts for nearly 20 per cent
of GDP but is home to some 80 per cent of the
total population. During the 1990s,
agricultural exports, principally of copra,
cocoa and palm oil, averaged around 20 per
cent of total exports but this share had fallen
to less than 7 per cent in 2002. The return of
peace in 2003 saw a recovery in agricultural
exports; by the end of 2004, fish accounted
for some 18 per cent of total exports while
cocoa and copra accounted for 6 and 4 per
cent, respectively. Forest products accounted
for some 65 per cent of total exports in 2004.
Logging exports have remained high
throughout the period of conflict due to the
activity being confined to the Western
Province, a region that experienced relatively
little fighting. The prevailing rate of logging,
at some 700,000 square metres per annum, is
estimated to be three times the sustainable
rate and, if continued, will see the
commercially valuable forests being depleted
by 2010–15 (International Monetary Fund
2004). Plantation forestry commenced only
in 1986, but the industry is in a nascent stage,
and thus unlikely to take the pressure off
logging of native forests over the short to
medium term. Major export commodities
such as palm oil and minerals are likely to
take considerable time to recover given the
damage done to plant and equipment and
continuing negotiations with landowners. In
the absence of growth in the other export
sectors, logging is likely to continue, for the
short term at least, as the major source of
internally generated foreign exchange and
government revenues.11
Manufacturing is a small sector,
accounting for less than 10 per cent of GDP.
The major manufacturing activities revolve
around processing of primary produce,
including fish canning, processing of oil
palm and copra, and small-scale timber
milling and tobacco processing: the last
solely for the domestic market.12 A small and
fragmented domestic market, lack of a
competitive transportation infrastructure,
expensive and unreliable utilities, and
extensive regulation including laws relating
to foreign direct investment have impeded
growth of this sector. While little can be done
in terms of policy in relation to the first (that
is, the small and fragmented market), policies
can be used to minimise the costs of the
remaining three.
The influx of a large expatriate
population has witnessed considerable
growth in construction, restaurant trade,
hotel and rental accommodation, but most
of this has been confined to Honiara. Tourism
has potential, but this will take time to be
realised. The rich culture, Second World War
relics, and pristine marine environment,
including a UNESCO World Heritage-listed
coral reef, suggest that Solomon Islands has
considerable potential for growth of tourism.
The prevalence of malaria, problems with
transportation (including the relatively high
costs of airfares compared to alternative
destinations such as Fiji and Vanuatu), lack
of tourist infrastructure, and the shadow of
the recent conflict suggest that it will be a
while before tourism becomes a major source
of income.
It is clear that the major challenge for
policymakers is to raise the rate of growth of
the econ omy; how this may be done is
unclear. A start could be made by relieving
the more obvious constraints to enterprise
so as to give the local private sector an
opportunity to increase investment. The
tasks involve improving access to
transportation infrastructure and island
shipping in particular so as to integrate the
local markets and allow exports. High value
tuna caught in Solomon Islands waters, for
example, is unable to reach the lucrative
Asian markets due to the lack of a competitive
transportation network. The poor state of
inter-island shipping and road
10
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infrastructure is hampering trade within the
country. Donors and the Asian Development
Bank, in particular, are working towards
addressing some of these problems. The
Japanese government is assisting with the
upgrading of the Honiara International
Airport, with electricity generation and water
supply for Honiara,13 and with rehabilitation
of the domestic tuna fisheries sector. The
Solomon Islands Government has appealed
for further donor assistance with the
upgrading of the main roads and bridges to
encourage economic activity on the two main
islands. Small dispersed island communities
have relied on canoes with outboard motors
as their means of contact with the major
centres; this remains the principal mode of
transport, but the high costs and unreliable
services have made much of agricultural
trade unprofitable for these communities.14
Poor access to competitively priced credit
has been identified as another impediment
to enterprise. The small and fragmented
market, together with an extended period of
poor law and order, has seen banking
services contract to the major urban centres
and the capital in particular. The improving
law and order situation and
experimentation with rural banking by a
major commercial bank may see some
recovery of the lost ground. Further research
on the constraints to extension of credit to
enterprises will have to be undertaken with
a view to improving access. The costs of
extending credit, including the costs of
enforcing debt contracts, will have to be
scrutinised if access to credit is to be
improved. Small producers working their
customary-owned land, and often with high
costs of transport to markets, face strong
diseconomies of scale.15 These producers,
therefore, need to be all the more productive
relative to their counterparts in larger
markets to be competitive in export markets.
Solomon Islands thus needs to specialise in
high-value products and draw on the best
technical expertise available to remain
competitive in its export markets.
The major foreign direct investments into
Solomon Islands are in the resource sector;
namely, logging, fishing, and gold mining.
Banking and plantation agriculture have
also attracted some foreign direct investment.
These sectors have returns that are
sufficiently large to cover the costs of
enterprise whilst offering the investors an
internationally competitive return on their
investment. Foreign investments are known
to supply capital, technical know-how, and
links into export markets, thus providing a
boost to growth. The lack of foreign direct
investment in labour-intensive sectors such
as manufacturing and services (tourism, for
example) suggests that the costs of such
investment may be prohibitive. The reform
of the tariff system, removal of discretion
with respect to customs duties, relaxation of
rules with respect to the issuing of work
permits, will all encourage foreign direct
investment.
Long-term investment such as in tourism
and plantation agriculture will necessitate
long term and secure access to land, however.
Facilitating such access will be a challenge,
given that some 87 per cent of land is held
under communal title. Tensions between
landowners and settlers have also hampered
the possibility of drawing workers from
labour-abundant regions such as the Malaita
province. Freer goods trade, both within the
nation that comprises several hundred small
communities and internationally, has the
potential to substitute for migration in order
to raise income. Naturally, scale issues imply
that there is a limit to the extent to which
goods trade can be used as a substitute for
labour mobility. Negotiations with
landowners in respect of foreign investments
in the gold mine and oil palm ventures were
continuing at the time of writing. Given the
political sensitivities, Solomon Islanders will
have to take the lead in resolving problems
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with long term and secure access to land and
with issues of internal migration. It is
nevertheless clear that improving access to
land and labour is central to any growth
strategy. Aqorau in advocating decentral-
isation with empowerment of resource
owners, notes that
[l]eaders should really work from the
grassroots, strengthen communal and
landowner participation in develop-
ment, augment the economic base of
the grassroots through their
participation in development, and
ensure strong economically viable
communities that provide for their own
social and economic welfare (Aqorau
2005:n.p.).
Economic reforms
An Economic Reform Unit was created
within the Ministry of Finance and Treasury
and charged with the responsibility of
coordinating reforms across the sectors and
the various stakeholders. The Economic
Reform Unit is heavily engaged in attracting
foreign direct investment into Solomon
Islands, having played a role in the
reopening of the oil palm plantation on
Guadalcanal and the lone gold mine. New
Britain Palm Oil Limited, the new foreign
investor in Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil
Limited, have demonstrated their capacity
in dealing effectively with communally
owned land in Papua New Guinea. The new
company has earmarked SBD$200 million
to be invested in the project over the next five
years. It is yet to be seen if New Britain Palm
Oil will be able to replicate its successes in
Papua New Guinea, but their willingness to
invest in Solomon Islands provides a strong
signal to other potential investors of the
improving investor climate. Australian
Solomons Gold is in the process of securing
finance before commencing reconstruction
work on the dilapidated mine site. It is
anticipated that Gold Ridge Mining will
begin producing gold at its refurbished mine
from late 2006; this would be a significant
boon to the economy as the mine was
contributing some 30 per cent of the GDP
prior to the eruption of fighting.
Public sector participation in commerce
is being rationalised. In this context,
privatisation strategies for Solomon Airlines,
the government-owned international carrier,
and the government-owned printery and
slipway are in progress. Donor support in
the form of technical assistance is being
sought for reforms in a number of sectors.
The World Bank is engaged in the review of
Solomon Islands Electricity Authority. The
Asian Development Bank is carrying out
studies of shipping and aviation sectors; and
is assisting the government formulate its
strategy for state-owned enterprise reform.
Rather than dealing with privatisation of
state-owned enterprises on a case-by-case
basis, as has been the practice to date, there
is a compelling case for the design of a generic
corporatisation and privatisation strategy for
the nation as a whole.
While the return of large foreign investors
to Solomon Islands is a healthy sign, the two
that have taken the plunge so far have done
so reportedly after being given substantial tax
concessions. The concessions provided have
been justified on the grounds that they will
generate broader interest amongst investors.
This may indeed be the case, but the task at
hand is to create an investor-friendly
environment that is neutral between investors.
Special deals for individual investors and
room for discretion run the risk of abuse, as
demonstrated during the crisis with respect
to the issue of import licenses and duty
concessions. It will take some effort to create a
neutral regime given the precedence created
by these ‘special deals’.
The challenge for the reformers is to create
an environment that is conducive to
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investment, both foreign and domestic. Much
of this work to date has revolved around
improving governance by increasing
transparency of decision-making and thus
reducing corruption. Logging and fisheries
pose particular challenges given the large
rents and the challenge of ensuring
sustainable management of these resources.
Reef fish around the heavily populated areas,
for example, are already being harvested well
beyond regenerative capacity. Work has
commenced on new foreign investment
legislation and a new tax system, both of
which are aimed at reducing the regulatory
barriers to investment. The government
signed the Pacific Islands Air Services
Agreement on 12 May 2005; it is hoped that
this ‘open skies’ policy will reduce the market
power of the incumbents and thus lower the
costs of air transport. The government has
also signed the Pacific Islands Civil Aviation
Safety and Security Treaty in the hope of
improving air safety. Enabling legislation for
the above were being drafted at the time of
writing. Trade liberalisation is continuing
with tariff rates reduced from five bands,
ranging from 5 to 70 per cent in 1998, to three
bands ranging from 5 to 20 per cent in 2004.
While some progress has been made in
the aviation sector, little has been done to
improve inter-island shipping. The latter is
important given the fragmented domestic
market and the critical role of inter-island
shipping in raising private sector output.
One option for the central government in
reducing regulatory barriers to investments
in transportation and communications
infrastructure would be to take carriage of
policies for the two sectors. This will reduce
anomalies between provinces and provide
greater security of market access for investors.
While regulatory reforms are targeted at
reducing red tape, obtaining secure, long-
term access to land remains a difficult issue.
Landowner concerns continue with respect
to both the gold mine and the oil palm
operations. Compounding the above issues
are problems with migrant labour. It is clear
that labour for any major operations on
Guadalcanal would have to be imported from
the other provinces, from Malaita in
particular. The large differences in
endowments of workers and other natural
resource endowments means that any major
investment at any locality would entail at
least some movement of workers. The risk of
reigniting the landowner–settler conflicts
from which the nation is emerging, with
substantial donor support, has to be
managed from the outset. Some of the
pressures for inter-provincial migration may
be relieved through provision of public
infrastructure more broadly within the
country. Auki, on Malaita, for example, has
the potential to develop labour-intensive
manufacturing provided inter-island
shipping becomes competitive. Solomon
Islanders must realise that basic economics
drives investment and thus some mobility of
people is not only inevitable but healthy for
economic growth, as it allows industries to
locate where they have the best chance of
success. The tuna-canning factory, for
example, has to be located close to a port and
to where most of the fish are caught. The fish
could be taken to the place where the workers
live (that is, the jobs could be moved to the
people), but the costs of doing so may be
prohibitive. Poor infrastructure in the
country, together with the highly varied levels
of access to services, are responsible in large
part for the uneven regional development and
the large internal migration.
Improving governance is a perennial
challenge in most of the Pacific islands and
Solomon Islands is not an exception. The
abuse of discretionary authority for personal
gain by senior members of the executive was
widespread during the crisis.16 Corruption
within the senior echelons of the public
service remains of serious concern. A
Corruption Targeting Task Force has been
13
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created within the Royal Solomon Islands
Police and is investigating both past and
ongoing allegations of abuse of positions of
authority for personal gain.
When will the need for RAMSI
expire?
While no-one is certain how long RAMSI will
be seen as necessary, the withdrawal of
troops from the six-year peacekeeping
mission to East Timor on 24 June 2005
provides some guidance.17 The peacekeeping
component of RAMSI is already being
wound down. The military was sent in to
provide security; thus with security restored
their withdrawal is overdue. The police were
sent to restore law and order; a significant
winding down on this front may also be
overdue given the achievements made to date.
The civilian component tasked to rebuild the
machinery of state is as yet a long way from
achieving its mandate, thus a lot more effort
may have to be devoted to this objective. The
region as a whole, and Australia in
particular, has an obligation to make a
credible commitment to a military and police
response to any deterioration in security
and/or law and order. As long as there is a
credible commitment of prompt deployment
of armed security personnel to Solomon
Islands, the chances of any deterioration
should be minimal.
Over its first six years of deployment,
RAMSI will cost Australian taxpayers alone
in excess of A$1.3 billion dollars.18 On a per
capita basis, Solomon Islands is one of the
largest recipients of Australian aid. It is
therefore useful to consider the length of time
that RAMSI should be in place. Let us consider
an optimistic scenario: one that is likely to
eventuate if all of the reforms being planned
for are successfully implemented and the
nation escapes any major natural disasters.
Four assumptions have to be made in working
out the minimal length of time before RAMSI
could be dismantled. First, the need for RAMSI
will disappear once the domestic economy is
able to fund the recurrent budget fully. Second,
tax revenue is assumed to be 26 per cent of
GDP. Third, the prevailing level of services
(law and order, for example) provided by the
public sector is the minimum necessary to
maintain peace and stability.19 Fourth, the rate
of growth of productivity in the delivery of
public goods equals the rate of population
growth.
At a tax take of 26 per cent of GDP,
aggregate GDP would need to grow by a factor
of 2.4 before support from donors to the
recurrent budget can be discontinued. How
long could this take? It would take
approximately a decade of sustained (real)
growth of aggregate GDP of around 9 per cent
per annum to reach such a level of output.
Such a rapid and sustained rate of growth is
unprecedented, possibly with the exception
of China in the recent past. None of the Pacific
island states has managed to achieve even
half of that rate of growth (that is 4.5 per cent
annual growth of GDP) over a decade. It will,
therefore, take a lot of effort (and good fortune
) to reach a growth target sufficient to see the
need for RAMSI expire within a decade. The
above scenario assumes that the development
budget will continue to be funded by donors.
Even the optimists would have to concede that
RAMSI will have to remain in place in some
form for a decade at least. The premature
departure of RAMSI could, at a minimum,
mean a much lower level of access to public
services and, at worst, a return to the dark
days of 1999 to 2003.
Conclusions
Peace and stability has been maintained
since the arrival in July 2003 of the Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. The
islanders, in welcoming the troops and police
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to their capital, did so in anticipation of a
quick return to normalcy and they were not
let down on this count. The slow bounce
back in income growth since the restoration
of peace is disappointing, but should not
have been unexpected. Implementing the
institutions and policies on which robust,
long-term economic growth is based is never
easy. Per capita income has recovered slowly
and in the two years since the arrival of
RAMSI has nudged back to 78 per cent of the
level just prior to the crisis. The challenge of
accelerating growth of output is critical if the
current generation of Solomon Islanders are
to see the end of RAMSI. Aggregate GDP will
have to more than double if the recurrent
outlays are to be funded from internally
generated revenue. This will take at least a
decade and only if rapid growth is sustained
over the full term of recovery. Such growth
will materialise only if the impediments to
investment are lowered considerably.
Solomon Islands, therefore, has to face up to
the challenges of development.
The four-year conflict weighed down
formal sector activity, particularly in the
capital, and pushed much market activity
into the subsistence sector. Slow recovery
suggests that the bulk of the impediments to
growth remain. Problems such as high costs
of transportation and utilities, the potential
for tensions between landowners and
settlers, and difficulties in acquiring land on
a secure and long-term basis remain. These
concerns need to be addressed if the economy
is to grow sufficiently quickly to alleviate the
need for the continuing presence of RAMSI.
Since the formation of RAMSI, donors have
been generous with Solomon Islands, but
better value could be extracted from this
generosity if the total value of inputs and the
deliverables are made more transparent.
The highly uneven rates of growth across
the archipelago are likely to sustain pressures
for migration from the poorer to the more
prosperous regions, with the ensuing
challenges of managing such a transition.
More widespread development across the
provinces, together with an expansion of
inter-island shipping, is likely to reduce
pressure for internal migration. The growth
of a Gizo-Auki-Honiara trading triangle, for
example, could act as a substitute for labour
mobility between the three major urban
centres. Solomon Islanders themselves must
take responsibility for instituting the
necessary reforms for growth of income.
RAMSI, however, has a role to play in
building capacity, including the training of
the locals who will in the very near future
take control of the process of designing and
implementing reforms. It is only the local
people who have the necessary information
and the self-interest in inducing change in
relation to politically sensitive issues such
as facilitating long-term and secure access
to land. The latter is critical to resolving some
of the problems between settlers and
landowners, the source of the conflict.
The achievements since the arrival of
RAMSI have been significant. Law and order
and fiscal prudence (critical to macro-
economic stability) have been achieved
through a combination of good management
and donor support. Donor support will not
last for long and is already being withdrawn
from the recurrent budget. The onus of
growing the economy to a level where it is
able to fund the recurrent outlays of the state
is on Solomon Islanders now. Given the
unsustainable debt position of the state,
donors may have a (limited) role in
supporting major capital works but the
initiatives for such investments will also have
to come from within Solomon Islands.
Questions remain as to whether there is the
political will to initiate such reforms and
whether the capacity exists to implement the
policies that are needed for private
investment and growth of production. The
term of the current government expires at the
end of this year, with national elections being
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planned for early 2006. The lead-up to
national elections will be an interesting
period since it will reveal the visions of the
aspiring political leadership.
Growth is critical for improvement in the
social indicators of development. Unless
growth of output accelerates soon, a generation
of Solomon Islanders will miss out on the
opportunity to see an improvement in their
wellbeing. This will be extremely unfortunate
given the large generosity of donors since the
inception of RAMSI. International experience
shows that aid has only a marginal role in
raising the rate of growth of income, thus the
onus is on Solomon Islanders to make the
best of available support while it is there.
Large injections of aid can provide the
resources to institute the more difficult
reforms, but it could just as well provide
funds that allow leaders to procrastinate
about the very reforms that are critical to
growth of production. Which of these two
prevail is a matter for Solomon Islanders to
decide.
Notes
1 The author forecast many of the challenges
in resuscitating the Solomon Islands economy
when RAMSI first arrived; many of the issues
raised then remain relevant (see Chand 2003).
2 Data sourced from the International
Development Statistics  Online database,
accessed on 11 July 2005. It was not possible
to get an accurate estimate of the level of
donor support provided and the breakdown
in terms of how much was spent in the
country, on salaries, and goods and services
under RAMSI.
3 The exchange rate as of 15 June 2005 was one
Australian dollar to SBD$5.76 and one United
States dollar to SBD$7.72.
4 The population growth rate has been falling;
it was 3.5 per cent in the 1970s.
5 The fertility rate is defined as ‘the number of
children that would be born to a woman if
she were to live to the end of her childbearing
years and bear children in accordance with
prevailing age-specific fertility rates’ (World
Bank 2003).
6 Some SBD$15 million has been transferred
from the 2005 recurrent budget to the
development budget for maintenance of
‘critical infrastructure’.
7 The Central Bank of Solomon Islands (2005)
reports a lower total debt figure; that of
SBD$1,782.5 million. The figures reported
here are sourced from the Ministry of Finance
and Treasury. The breakdown of the total
debt of SBD$2,192.2 million, according to the
Ministry, comprised of external debt of
SBD$1,183.6 million (including interest
arrears), domestic debt of SBD$525.7 million,
and estimates of other debt obligations, such
as trade creditor arrears, contingent liabilities,
guarantees and provincial debts of SBD$482.88
million.
8 The National Provident Fund in 2003
accounted for two thirds of total banking
sector assets. Some 25 per cent of the assets
of the Fund comprised government securities;
another 17 per cent comprised loans to
government entities, and a further 18 per cent
was equity in public enterprises. Member
contributions to 2002 amounted to SBD$317
million (Chand 2003).
9 The figures reported here are from the 2004
Annual Report of the National Provident
Fund, as reported by Pacific Beat of 18 March
2005.
10 External debt that is being serviced is only to
the international financial institutions, thus
leaving out the other external creditors.
11 Logging exports accounted for two-thirds of
total merchandise exports in 2003
(International Monetary Fund 2004).
12 Some of the milled timber is exported.
13 This work is being undertaken in partnership
with the World Bank.
14 The recent decision by the Minister of Finance
and Treasury to eliminate import duties on
shipping vessels, outboard motors (of up to
40 horsepower), parts, and marine safety
equipment is with a view to lowering
shipping costs.
15 The difference between customary ownership
and communal ownership is that the former
comprises individual rights but this is
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established and enforced by the clan as a
whole.
16 Abuses included the granting of tax
exemptions and citizenship certificates, as well
as large compensation payments to cronies.
17 The first of the nearly 13,000 Australian
troops that served in East Timor arrived there
in September 1999.
18 Costs of the military component of RAMSI
are unavailable. Australian aid over the term
of RAMSI amounts to in excess of A$400 per
year for every man, woman and child in
Solomon Islands.
19 Solomon Islanders have to decide on the level
of services that they will be able to fund
independently. This is important given the
current donor-determined level of service
provision.
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Table A1 GDP, and per capita GDP, 1978–2004 (constant 1995 US$, million)
Year GDP GDP per capita GDP per capita growth
(US$ million) (annual, per cent) 
1978 106.7 498.5 5.23
1979 133.3 601.7 20.7
1980 125.2 546.8 –9.1
1981 142.1 599.4 9.6
1982 146.3 595.8 –0.6
1983 166.6 655.3 10.0
1984 168.6 641.1 –2.2
1985 170.1 625.2 –2.5
1986 203.7 724.7 15.9
1987 208.7 718.6 –0.8
1988 216.2 721.2 0.4
1989 233.8 755.7 4.8
1990 237.9 745.9 –1.3
1991 246.5 749.9 0.5
1992 269.5 796.7 6.2
1993 274.9 790.1 –0.8
1994 289.2 809.0 2.4
1995 309.5 843.2 4.2
1996 320.3 850.1 0.8
1997 312.8 808.4 –4.9
1998 316.4 796.4 –1.5
1999 312.2 765.3 –3.9
2000 277.9 663.1 –13.4
2001 252.8 587.0 –11.5
2002 248.8 561.1 –4.4
2003 258.3 566.8 1.0
2004 273.2 583.8 3.0
Source: Data to 2001 is from World Bank 2003. Data from 2001 onwards is based on growth rates reported
by International Monetary Fund, 2004. Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV Consultation, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; and Asian Development Bank, 2005. Country programming mission to
the Solomon Islands 2005, Mission Report, Asian Development Bank, Manila (unpublished).
